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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is an extension of a recent study into the relationship between merger size and 
profitability. It studies a class of Cournot oligopoly with linear cost and quadratic demand. Its 
focus is to analyze how a merger’s profitability is affected by its size and by the demand 
elasticity. Such results have not yet been reported in previous studies, perhaps due to the 
complexity of the equilibrium equation involved. It shows an increase in the demand elasticity 
also raises a merger’s profitability. Consequently, an increase in the demand elasticity reduces 
merged members’ critical combined per-merger market share for the merger to be profit 
enhancing.  Comparing with 80% minimum market share requirement for a profitable merger 
in Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983), a greater market share is needed when the demand 
function is concave (demand is relatively inelastic), while a smaller market share may still be 
profitable when the demand function is convex (demand is relatively elastic). In our model, 
mergers are generally detrimental to public interests by increasing market price and reducing 
output. However, the merger will be less harmful when the goods are very inelastic.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1980s, there has been a burgeoning wave of mergers resulting in large part from 
globalization and free trade. However, few firms conspire to be a monopoly, even though it is 
always profitable, since it always attracts government regulation and arouses consumer anger, 
such as in the case of Microsoft. On the other hand, oligopolies can more easily avoid constant 
attention of the regulators, while simultaneously earning profits greater than those possible in a 
more competitive market. With economic globalization, the growth of oligopoly merging poses 
problems both for economic theory and for economic policy.  
In an oligopoly model, what is the benchmark for the merger to be profitable, which 
determines the likelihood of the merger, and what is social welfare effect, which is vital to the 
policy making, become the main concern to the economists in the industrial organization. A 
wide range of economic literature has been devoted to providing related analysis on the effect 
of the merger size on the profitability.  
In the earlier industrial organization literature, it is generally presumed that horizontal 
merging is always profit enhancing to the coalition members in the Cournot case even with 
constant returns to scale, since they always have the choice of reproducing the same amount of 
products as pre-merger level. This assumption was challenged by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 
(1983) (SSR model hereafter). The model they employed uses constant marginal cost and linear 
demand. They showed that given the outputs of the other players, the merged firms would have 
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an incentive to alter its production, which means the output and market prices are endogenously 
determined. Thus their pre-merger production level will not be an equilibrium following the 
merger. Furthermore, they developed the sufficient condition for the merger to be profitable, 
which is 80% pre-merger market share for its existing coalition members. However, the model 
they use is specifically simplified, and the result will not be significantly meaningful when 
applied to other models.  
 When Farrell and Shapiro (1990) analyzed horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly with 
general demand and general costs, they found that any merger not creating synergies raises 
price. Furthermore, on the condition that a merger’s initial joint market share does not exceed 
the weighted sum of the outsider’s total market share in a linear Cournot model, they show that 
if the merger is profitable and raises the market price, it would raise welfare as well. This 
conclusion could be interpreted as the alternative to Levin (1990)’s finding, which shows any 
profitable merger whose combined pre-merger market share makes up no more than 50 percent 
of the total market output will raise welfare, and is the so called 50% benchmark (FSL 
hereafter).  
  However, this 50 percent rule could not be generalized to any Cournot models. Recently, 
work by Heubeck, Smythe, and Zhao (2005) studied a linear Cournot model with asymmetric 
cost. They find the set of profitable, welfare-enhancing mergers is much larger than the set 
defined by the 50% rule when using this more restrictive model. This result is counter-intuitive, 
because the 50% rule is derived from FSL, a much more general model. Furthermore, they also 
derive the conditions for the merger to be profitable, including the critical number of the 
merging firms and their combined pre-merger market share.  
 As the above mentioned, many economists have long observed that a merger may reduce 
the joint profits of the participating firms. However, a coalition might not always end up losing 
even if it does not occupy large market share, say 80% in the SSR model. The merger may be 
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profitable in other models, as analyzed by Deneckere and Davidson (1985). Focusing on the 
case of firms that produce differentiated products with Bertrand competition, they demonstrate 
that mergers of any size are beneficial, and large mergers are more profitable than smaller ones. 
The difference in those two opposite results lies in the fact that reaction functions are typically 
upward sloping in price games, but downward sloping in quantity games; with price as the 
strategic variable, mergers will be profitable all the times.       
 While the previous articles together bring a more coherent understanding of how the 
merger size affects a coalition’s profitability, the model specified in this thesis has never been 
studied. The model is actually an extension of a SSR model, and the only difference between 
these two models is: instead of linear demand, we assume a nonlinear quadratic demand 
function, with the demand elasticity factor d determining the convexity or concavity of the 
demand function. In general, with the increase in the demand elasticity, producers are inclined 
to produce more, and they are more profitable in the SSR model over a large range of d, the 
exception being that goods are relatively inelastic under a convex demand model1. The welfare 
comparison is straightforward; the social welfare is at the maximum when the demand function 
is convex and the minimum when the demand function is concave. 
 By shifting the focus from the SSR model to the pre-merger and post-merger equilibria, we 
demonstrate that the merged firms will contract their total output relative to the pre-merger 
level, while other firms will expand their output in response to the merging. Furthermore, the 
total output in the market is reduced after the merger, which in turn pushes up the price in the 
industry, regardless of whether the demand function is convex or concave. Thus, mergers are 
always detrimental to the consumer surplus and social welfare in this specified model. 
However, it does not imply that the demand elasticity has no effect on the suppliers’ output 
                                                 
1 When 0
)2(
)1(4 3
2
<<+
+− d
n
n
ω  in the non-linear demand model, producers are more profitable than those 
in the SSR model. 
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decisions. In fact, the less elastic the goods, the more likely the post-merger output level will be 
close to their pre-merger level, with the same pattern exhibited in the market price as well. In 
this case, the merger will be less harmful. 
 Following the analysis of the effect of demand elasticity on output and price, we develop 
the sufficient conditions for a merger to be profit enhancing. Even though it is expected that the 
concavity or convexity of the demand function and the merger’s profitability are related, the 
results are still appealing. Our analysis shows that when the demand function is convex (d<0), 
the greater absolute value of d, the lower the combined pre-merger market share is required for 
the merger to be profit enhancing. Contrary to this, when firms face a concave demand function 
(d>0), the greater the value of d, the higher the coalition’s market share required. Moreover, the 
relationship between demand elasticity and the coalition’s profitability is explored. It shows, for 
a profitable merger, an increase in demand elasticity raises a merger’s profitability.  
In summary, the structure of my thesis is organized as follows: After formally specifying 
the model in Chapter 2, we introduce the pre-merger equilibrium in Chapter 3, and compare it 
with the SSR model. Chapter 4 examines how a merger’s profitability is influenced by its size, 
and how elasticity of demand produces effects on the profitable merger’s critical combined 
pre-merger market share and profitability. Finally, Chapter 5 offers conclusions and suggestions 
for future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
 
This study focuses on a horizontal merger in a symmetric Cournot Model with linear cost, 
and with quadratic demand, affected by a demand elasticity factor denoted by d. The purpose of 
my analysis is to find out how the demand elasticity factor makes our result different from the 
SSR model, and affects the conditions required for the merger to be profitable and welfare 
enhancing; as well as what the merger size benchmark is for the merger to be profitable under 
this model.  
 
2.1 Hypothesis and Model Description 
Consider n (n>1) firms competing as Cournot players. Firm i  chooses its production 
0≥iq . Let ∑ == ni iqQ 1 be the total production. As in previous studies, we assume that a unique 
Cournot equilibrium always exists. Each firm faces an inverse non-linear quadratic demand 
function 2
2
)( QdQaQP −−= . 
Even though different marginal costs provide additional incentives to a merger, in order 
to focus on the effect of the shape of the demand function on the profitability, as in the SSR 
model, we make the following assumption: each firm operates at a constant marginal and 
average cost of c , thus icqqCi =)( , where ++∈ Rca ),( with ca > ; the demand curve is 
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downward sloping, hence 0<∂
∂
Q
P 2; and d is a demand elasticity factor, d
Q
P −=∂
∂
2
2
 where the 
demand function is concave when d>0, and convex when d<0.  
Consider m ( nm ≤≤2 ) firms form a merger denoted as M， { }mM ,...,1= , then for each 
coalition member i  )( Mi∈ , it produces ∑ == mi iM qq 1 ; and for each non-coalition member j  
)( Mj∉ , it produces jq . For convenience, as in the SSR model, we will refer to the subset of 
firms that will participate in the merger as “insiders”, and other firms that will continue to 
behave independently after the merger as “outsiders”.    
The main purpose of this analysis is to find out the effects of the demand elasticity on the 
critical profitable merger size and on the coalition’s profitability. Thus, before we derive the 
pre-merger and post-merger equilibria, it is necessary to examine the demand elasticity factor d 
and demand elasticity first.  
 
2.2 The Feasible Range of Demand Elasticity Factor “d” 
This subsection is designed to illustrate the restrictions imposed on the demand elasticity 
factor from our specified model, and to determine its feasible range. Notice that my results 
include the SSR model as a special case when d=0.      
Lemma 1 
⎪⎪⎭
⎪⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
+
−−>
qna
d
)
2
1(
1,
2
1max   
Lemma 1 is derived from the following 3 restrictions:  
(1)The demand curve is downward sloping or 01 <−−=∂
∂ dQ
Q
P  
                                                 
2 01 <−−=∂
∂ dQ
Q
P , it holds automatically when d>0; when 
Q
dd 1,0 −>< , this condition holds if the 
Second Order Condition for profit maximization holds as shown in Proof of Proposition 1 in appendix.  
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(2) For profit maximization, the second order condition requires: 0
2
2
<∂
∂
i
i
q
π , 
or 
qn
d
)12(
2
+−> (as shown in Proof of Proposition 1 in appendix) 
(3) The demand function could be concave or convex, depending on d>0 or d<0.  
 )
2
1()1(
22
22 a
dd
QdQdQaP +++−=−−=  
♦ Concave demand function: The maximum point )
2
1,1( a
dd
+− is located in 
quadrant II, or 0
2
1&01 >+<− a
dd
 
♦ Convex demand function: The minimum point )
2
1,1( a
dd
+− is located in 
quadrant IV, or 0
2
1&01 <+>− a
dd
 
In summary, When d>0, the above three conditions automatically hold.  
     
nqQ
d 11 −=−>     (1) 
When d<0,   
qnqn
d
)2
1(
1
)12(
2
+−=+−>  (2)  ⎪⎪⎭
⎪⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
+
−−>⇒
qna
d
)
2
1(
1,
2
1max  
a
d
2
1−>      (3) 
 
It is obvious from the above analysis, that d could be indefinitely large when it is positive. 
However, when d is negative, it is close to “0”. Alternatively, it could be interpreted as the 
convex demand function tends to be linear, and the concave demand function could be curved 
to any degree.   
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2.3 The Demand Elasticity “ε ” and the Demand Elasticity factor “ d ”  
Theoretically, the greater the demand elasticity, the more responsive the demand is to the 
changes in the price. The parameter “d” has direct effects on the demand elasticity. In order to 
explore how the merger’s profitability is affected by the demand elasticity, it is necessary for us 
to explore the relationship between the demand elasticity “ ε ” and the demand elasticity factor 
“ d ”.  
 
Lemma 2 A smaller “ d ” implies the good is more elastic, or has a bigger absolute value of 
“ ε ”, assuming that P/Q remains unchanged.  
Solve for Q from the demand function: )(2122(
2
1
2
)( 2 Pad
d
QQdQaQP −++−=⇒−−= , 
as long as 0≠d 3 
Then, the demand elasticity:  
( )
Q
PPad
Q
P
P
Q
2
1
)(21 −−+−=∂
∂=ε  
Since [ ] 0)(21)( 23 <−+−−=∂
∂ −PadPa
d
ε
  
ε⇒  is decreasing in d, regardless of whether “d” is positive or negative.   
 
Keep in mind that such negative relationship between demand elasticity and the demand 
elasticity factor “d” assumes that small changes in d have no effects on P/Q.  We are in a 
position to explore the pre-merger and post-merger equilibrium. 
                                                 
3 The other solution )(2122(
2
1 Pad
d
Q −+−−= could be eliminated from our analysis, because when 
d>0, it is negative, and when d<0, the demand function is upward sloping, which is contradictory with 
our previous assumption that 0<∂
∂
Q
P .   
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CHAPTER 3 
PRE-MERGER AND POST-MERGER EQUILIBRIUM 
 
This chapter presents equilibrium outputs, profits and price, which is crucial to further 
analysis on the merger’s profitability. To gain a more accurate picture of our proposed model, 
we compare it with the SSR model. A comparison between the pre-merger and post-merger 
equilibrium regarding the output and price is offered as well.   
 
3.1 Pre-merger Equilibrium   
The following proposition characterizes the market in equilibrium before the coalition 
forms, including the merged members’ individual output, profit, and their combined profit, as 
well as the market output level, industry price, producer surplus and consumer surplus.  
 
Proposition 1 Let the pre-merger equilibrium individual firm’s output and profit be 0iq , 0iπ  
respectively. Let 0Mπ  be the merged members’ combined pre-merger profits, and let the total 
industry output, price, profit and consumer surplus be Q0 , P0, 0π ,CS0  respectively, then:   
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+++−+= )2)((2)1(1-)2(
1 20 ncadnnn
ndn
qi   
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Notice that the other solution ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−++−+= )2)((2)1(-1-)2(
1 20 ncadnnn
ndn
qi was 
eliminated from our analysis, because of the downward sloping demand assumption. 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+++−+= )2)((2)1(21-)2(
1 20 ncadnnn
nd
Q  
2
2
0
)2(
))(2(2)1()1()2)(2(
+
−+++−++++=
nd
canndnnacnnd
P  
000 )( ii qcP −=π  
000 )( iM qcPm −=π  
000 )( QcP −=π  
∫ ×−−−= 00 0020 )2(Q QPdQQdQaCS  
Notice that: 
♦ When d=0, these results become identical to the SSR model. 
♦ Second order condition requires that 
0)2
1(
1
qn
d +−>   
All proofs of proposition 1 are in the Appendix, including the detailed formula for profits 
and consumer surplus.  
 
3.2 Comparing with the SSR Model   
The only difference between the model we specified and the SSR model is the quadratic 
inverse demand function 2
2
)( QdQaQP −−=  compared with QaQP −=)(  in the SSR model. 
The questions remain: Does concavity (convexity) in demand increase or decrease equilibrium 
price, individual supply and profit? What about the effect on the consumer surplus and welfare? 
Proposition 2 sets about answering these questions. To simplify the analysis further, we 
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compare these two models in per-merger equilibrium.4 Before presenting this proposition, we 
first introduce some results from the SSR model: 
1
0
+
−=
n
caqiL , 
( )
2
2
0
)1( +
−=
n
ca
iLπ  and 1
0
+
+=
n
cnaPL ,  
where 0iLq , 0iLπ  are each producer’s output and profit respectively, and 0LP  is the market 
price in the pre-merger equilibrium in the linear demand model.  
 
Proposition 2 Let 00 & iLi qq , 00 & LPP , 00 & iLi ππ  be the Cournot pre-merger equilibrium 
individual firm’s outputs, market price and individual firm’s profit for quadratic and linear 
demand models respectively. Then: 
(1) 00 iLi qq < , if d>0 
   00 iLi qq > , if d<0 
(2) 00 LPP > , if d>0 
   00 LPP < , if d<0 
(2) 00 iLi ππ < , if ω3
2
)2(
)1(
4 +
+−<
n
nd  or 0>d   
00
iLi ππ > , if 0
)2(
)1(
4
3
2
<<+
+− d
n
n
ω  
00
iLi ππ = , if ω3
2
)2(
)1(
4 +
+−=
n
nd  or 0=d  
The above results indicate that when individual firms face a concave demand function, they 
will produce fewer outputs, and the product market price will be higher compared with the 
linear demand model. The result will be the opposite when we apply this to a convex demand 
                                                 
4 Notice that the result will be the same when we derive from the post-merger equilibrium, except 
)1( +−mn  is substituted for n.  
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function model. In general, producers in the SSR model earn more profit, except when the 
demand is relatively inelastic under a convex demand function model. Proposition 2 may be 
illustrated by the below example.   
Example 3.1 Consider there are n=100 firms in the market and each operates with constant  
marginal and average cost: c=40, and the demand function is 2
2
100 QdQP −−= , each supplier 
produces 0iq , gains profit 0iπ , and the market price is 0P . When the demand function is 
QP −=100 , each supplies 0iLq , gains profit 0iLπ , and the market price is 0LP .
 
Each individual firm’s output difference  
between these two models would be 
 
d
dd
qq iLi
612000)12240001020110110201
1030200
1
00
++−−
=−
Then: 
00
iLi qq < , if 0>d  
00
iLi qq > , if 0<d  
Note: the Vertical axis is the product difference. 
Figure 3.1: Output Comparison 
with the SSR Model 
 
The industry price difference between these 
two models would be: 
d
dd
PP L
61200012240001020110110201
1050804
1
00
++−
=−
Then 
00
LPP > , if 0>d  
00
LPP < , if 0<d    
Note: the Vertical axis is the price difference. 
  
 
Figure 3.2 Price Comparison with 
the SSR Model 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
-0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.04
00
LPP −  
d
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1
0.2
-0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.04
00
iLi qq −  
d
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Each individual firm’s profit difference between these two models would be:   
2
2
00
00191017440010406040101254845412122400010201)103030162430120(
005412691404
1
d
dddd
iLi
+−−++
=−ππ
   
Then 
00
iLi ππ < , if 15918120
10201−<d  or 0>d  
00
iLi ππ > , if 015918120
10201 <<− d  
00
iLi ππ = , if 15918120
10201−=d  or 0=d  
Figure 3.3 shows the change in profit difference with respect to the change in d.  
 
Figure 3.3 Profit Comparison with the SSR Model 
 
  
Social welfare is always a concern to most economists and policy makers; corollary 1 
compares the consumer surplus and welfare effects between SSR and our model.   
  
Corollary 1 Let 0 0>dCS  and 0 0>dW  be the Cournot pre-merger equilibrium consumer surplus 
and welfare when the demand function is concave, and let 0 0<dCS  and 0 0<dW  be the consumer 
surplus and welfare when the demand function is convex, and let 0LCS  and 0LW  be the 
consumer surplus and welfare in the SSR model, then: 
-0.0003
-0.00025
-0.0002
-0.00015
-0.0001
-5e-05
0
-0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.02 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008 
00
iLi ππ −  
d  
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(1.1) 0 000 0 <> << dLd CSCSCS  
(1.2) 0 000 0 <> << dLd WWW
 
 
Figure 3.4 Comparisons between Quadratic Demand Model and 
the SSR Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 3.4  
Point A (PL, QL) is the equilibrium in the SSR model.  
Point B (P1, Q1) is the equilibrium when the demand function is concave.  
Point C (P2, Q2) is the equilibrium when the demand function is convex.  
 
P 
c 
PS 
CS 
a 
)0(
2
2 <−−= dQdQaP  
QaP −=  
PL 
P1 
P2 
aQL
)0(
2
2 >−−= dQdQaP  
Q1 Q2
P1 is the equilibrium price when d>0 
PL is the equilibrium price in SSR model 
P2 is the equilibrium price when d<0
B
A
C
DWL.2DWL.1 DWL.L
Q 
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The comparison between our quadratic non-linear model and the SSR model can be 
illustrated in Figure 3.4. Even though it is ambiguous to rank the industry profits among these 
three cases, it is quite obvious from this graph that consumers will gain due to increased output 
and reduced price in the market when d<0, and will definitely lose when d>0, compared with 
the linear demand model. As for the welfare effect, when d<0, since the gain to the consumer is 
so big, it is sufficiently large enough to preponderate over the loss to the producers (if they have 
a loss) and therefore welfare increases. On the contrary, when d>0, welfare is smaller compared 
with the SSR model. However, it is not clear which demand curve is the optimal one to achieve 
social efficiency, since the deadweight loss varies with both the output level and the demand 
elasticity.  
A few words must be added in linking the results presented to the theoretical discussion of 
demand elasticity and suppliers’ output production decisions. In a quantity-setting game, when 
the product is more elastic (d becomes smaller), producers are inclined to produce more, 
because a huge output expansion could only be followed by a marginal decrease in output price. 
As for consumers, they definitely will gain because of the lower price and higher outputs. And 
social welfare will increase as well, compared with a product that is less elastic.  
All of the previous discussions focus on the pre-merger equilibrium. There is still the 
question of how the merger has an impact on this equilibrium. The next section presents the 
post-merger equilibrium.  
 
3.3 Post-merger Equilibrium   
Before analyzing the output, price and profitability effect of the merger, it is necessary to 
obtain the post-merger equilibrium. The below proposition shows the equilibrium insiders’ 
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output and profit, the outsider’s output and profit, and the output of the whole industry, market 
price, as well as consumer surplus and producer surplus after the merger.   
 
Proposition 3 Let the post-merger equilibrium individual firm’s output and profit be *iq , *iπ . 
Let *Mπ  be the combined merged parties’ profits, and let the total industry output, price, profit 
and consumer surplus be *Q , *P , *π  and *CS  respectively. Then 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+−−++−++−+−+−= )3)(1)((2)2(2)m-()3)(1(
1 2* mnmncadmnn
mnmnd
qi  
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+−−++−++−+−= )3)(1)((2)2(2)m-()3(
1 2* mnmncadmnn
mnd
Q  
2
2
*
)3(
)3)(1)((2)2()2()2)1()(3(
+−
+−+−−++−−+−+++−+−=
mnd
mnmncadmnmnamncmnd
P  
*** )( ii qcP −=π  
*** )( iM qcP −=π  
*** )( QcP −=π  
∫ ×−⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−=
*
0
**2*
2
Q
QPdQQdQaCS  
Notice that { } *1)1(2
2
iqmn
d ++−
−> , from S.O.C. 
 
3.4 Pre-merger and Post-merger Equilibrium Comparisons    
The purpose of this subsection is to demonstrate the impact of merging on the individual 
firm’s output decision, both for insiders and outsiders, as well as the industry output and price. 
Furthermore, it analyzes if the demand elasticity factor “d” has an impact on the equilibrium. It 
gives us a clearer picture of how the market reacts in response to the merger, and offers a 
foundation for further analysis on a coalition’s profitability.  
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  In order to derive the impact of “d” on total output change in the market, we impose the 
following restriction on the demand function.  
Assumption 1 (A1)5: 0
2
2
<∂
∂+∂
∂
iq
Q
P
Q
P 6 for all Qqi ≤≤0 , as long as P>0 
There are two different interpretations for this assumption in the literature: 
♦ Hahn (1962) first made this assumption, and he interpreted it as: at all possible outputs, the 
marginal revenue of any one producer with a given output is a diminishing function of the 
total output of his rivals.  
♦ Ruffin (1971) shows the reasonableness of this assumption, and offers an alternative 
interpretation, which is: “at all possible outputs, the marginal revenue function facing any 
firm is steeper than the demand function.”    
♦ Levin (1990) mentions A1 as an important extension of the example in the SSR which 
assumes that 0
2
2
=∂
∂
Q
P .  
 
The next proposition compares the pre-merger and post-merger equilibrium. 
Proposition 4 Let the pre-merger equilibrium individual firm’s output, the total industry output 
and price be 0iq , 0Q , and 0P respectively. Let the post-merger equilibrium individual firm’s 
output, the total industry output and price be *iq , *Q  and *P  respectively. Then 0* ii mqq −  
will be the total insiders’ output change, 0* ii qq −  will be each outsider firm’s output change, 
0* QQ −  will be the total industry output change, and 0* PP − will be the market price 
                                                 
5 Levin (1990) uses this assumption to derive the total output impact of the merger in a general model, 
which shows that the total output in the industry will expand (contract) if the merger expands (contracts) 
its output level.  
6 0)(1
2
2
<+−−=∂
∂+∂
∂ qQdq
Q
P
Q
P
i  
This condition automatically holds when d>0, and when d is negative, 
)1(
10 +
−>>
nq
d .  
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difference. Let *iLq , *LQ  and *LP  be the Cournot post-merger equilibrium coalition’s 
combined outputs (or each outsider’s output), total market outputs, and market price in the SSR 
model respectively. Then, 
(1) The Merger leads to a contraction of the insiders’ total output relative to the pre-merger 
level.  
0*
ii mqq < , as long as 0≠d  
Remark: 0*lim ii
d
mqq =
∞→
 
**
0
lim iLid
qq =→  
(2) Each outsider will expand their output in response to the merging.  
0*
ii qq > , as long as 0≠d  
Remark: 0*lim ii
d
qq =
∞→
 
**
0
lim iLid
qq =→  
(3) The Merger leads to the contraction of the total output in the market relative to the 
pre-merger level.7  
0* QQ < , as long as 0≠d  
Where *** FM QQQ +=  and 000 FM QQQ += , for all )(&)( FjjMii ∈∈ . 
Where 0MQ  is the insiders’ total outputs before the merger. 
Where 0FQ  is the outsiders’ total outputs before the merger. 
Where *MQ  is the insiders’ total outputs after the merger. 
Where *FQ  is the outsiders’ total outputs after the merger. 
Remark: 0*lim QQ
d
=
∞→
 
                                                 
7 Levin (1990) proved proposition 4, (3) by assuming proposition 4, (1) for a general case.  
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**
0
lim Ld
QQ =→  
As for the price effect, it is obvious that the contraction of the output supply will always 
push up the price. The related proofs for proposition 4 are in the appendix.  
 Given the pre-merger output level of the outsiders, the insiders tend to reduce their 
post-merger outputs. On the other hand, the outsiders will expand their outputs in response to a 
higher price, which is one of the main effects of the merging. They become the free riders in the 
industry, followed by further output reduction of insiders. After all of these adjustments have 
taken place, coalition members may be unprofitable compared with the pre-merger level; since 
the gain from a higher price could not outweigh the loss from lower output, their share of the 
pie decreased. Not surprisingly, in order to overcome outsiders’ output expansion effect, a 
merger needs to have at least 80% market share for it to be profitable in the SSR model.  
Since in our model, the demand elasticity factor d is a crucial factor for its effect on the 
profitability conditions, I would like to include the graphs for positive d and negative d 
respectively, where the demand function is concave when d>0, and convex when d<0. 
Furthermore, from these diagrams, we see that the range of d required to fulfill the concave or 
convex demand function assumptions has been satisfied. As for the consumer surplus and 
welfare effect, we can achieve the conclusion without numerical proof.  
 
Corollary 2 
(2.1) We could apply the SSR results to our specified quadratic demand model when d is close 
to “0”, since the demand function tends to be linear. 
(2.2) *0 CSCS > , due to increase in price and decrease in output in the market.  
(2.3) *0 WW > , because of the increase in the deadweight loss after the merger.  
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Figure 3.5 Comparisons between Pre-merger and Post-merger Equilibrium 
(when d>0) 
 
In Figure 3.5 and 3.6, the convexity or concavity of the demand function does not change 
the main outcomes of merging. However, when the demand elasticity factor is very large, which 
implies the good is perfectly inelastic (it could be represented by the inner light demand 
function in Figure 3.5, where dd >2 ), it will be difficult for the coalition to reduce the output 
level by a large enough factor to increase the market price. In this case, the merger will be less 
harmful.  
       
The results from proposition 4 and corollary 2 are consistent with merger theory. The aim 
of merging is to increase profit by reducing the competition. An industry will be less 
competitive when there are fewer firms. The Cournot oligopoly players in this model will 
restrict the amount of output they produce in order to push up the price, and this is detrimental 
to the public interests.   
P 
c 
P0
PS 
CS 
a 
2
2
QdQaP −−=  
Q*  Q0 
QaP −=  
)
2
1,1( a
dd
+−  
a 
P*
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)(
2 2
22 ddQdQaP >−−=  
Q 
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Figure 3.6 Comparisons between Pre-merger and Post-merger Equilibrium 
 (when d<0) 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROFITABILITY EFFECT 
 
Only profitable mergers will exist, and are of policy makers and economists’ interests. This 
chapter derives the sufficient conditions for a merger to be profit enhancing relative to the 
pre-merger equilibrium. It also explores how demand elasticity affects the merger’s 
profitability.  
 
4.1 Profitability Conditions  
Equation 4.1 gives the merger’s profit change, where *Mπ  is the merger’s post-merger profit, 
and 0Mπ  is the insiders’ combined pre-merger profit.  
{ } { }
)1()1(
)()12)(1(2
)1()1(
)()12)(1(
2 222222
0*
−+
+−+++−+−−+
+−+++−+=−
XXd
XXXXdm
YYd
YYYYd
MM
ααωββωππ   (4.1) 
Where 
)1(2
)1(2
22
22
−+=
−+=
YdY
XdX
ωβ
ωα
 
  Where ca −=ω  
1+= nX  
2+−= mnY  
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Proposition 5 Let *m and *θ  be the critical merger size and the critical market share for a 
profitable merger, then the merger is profit enhancing for the insiders if any of the following 2 
claims is met:  
)(i mm <*  
)(ii θθ <*  
Where ρ=*m , and ρ is a root of 0665544332210 =++++++ ZZZZZZ βββββββ 8 (4.2) 
In order to simplify the notation further, let: 
1)42()21( 2 ++++= ndnd ωωα , which is the same as )1(2 22 −+= XdX ωα in 
equation 4.1.  
)1()2(1 +++= nndP ω ,  
2
2 )1()12)(2( ++++= ndnnP ω  
 
Then: )12()2( 62220 ++−= ωωβ dnnd  
( ) )()2()992()2(2 212231 PPnnndnn −+++++= αωβ  
( ) )()2(2)94()2(2)()3)(1( 21322132 PPnndnnPPnn −++++−−++= αωαβ  
2
21
2
21
3
3 )()3)(32(2))(12()2(2 PPnnPPdnn −++−−++= ααωβ  
2
214 ))(2)(3(6 PPnn −++= αβ  
2
215 ))(25(2 PPn −+−= αβ  
2
216 )( PP −= αβ  
Where 
n
m** =θ  
                                                 
8 There are 6 solutions to this equation. However, there is only one feasible solution.  
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The above analysis indicates that an increase in the merger size or market share would 
increase a merger’s profitability. We will use example 4.1 to illustrate proposition 5.   
Example 4.1: Consider a market of 100 firms, where each firm operates at a constant marginal 
and average cost: c=40. The demand function is: 2100 QQP −−= , where 2=d . In order to 
find the critical value of the merger size *m , let 00* =− MM ππ , or   
01095253.7
)101()103(
)102(2)2203)(103(240241491641050712.2)12112462(0.2
25.0
2
3
226
=×−
−−
−−−−−+−×−
− m
mm
mmmmmm
(4.3) 
Then 992.100,8451.91,999999.0,2815.11153.103,2815.11153.103 54321 ===−=+= mmmimim  
8451.91* =⇒ m %845.91* =⇒θ  
 
Figure 4.1 Merger’s sizes and its Profitability 
 
The horizontal axis represents the  
♦ The horizontal axis represents the 
merger size. 
 
♦ The vertical axis represents the 
merger’s profitability change.  
 
Based on equation 4.3, we derive Figure 4.1. When the coalition members’ combined 
pre-merger market share is greater than 91.845%, the merger is profitable. As noted from the 
above figure, when the merger is large enough to be profitable, an increase in one more 
coalition member will increase the merger’s profit by a large amount, which could be 
represented by the very steep upward sloping part of the curve. In this very incompetitive 
market, even the free riders’ output expansion could not prevent the merger from being 
profitable.  
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 Even though this figure shows that under concave demand, greater market share is required 
for the merger to be profit enhancing compared with the linear demand model, this single 
example could not be used to systematically evaluate the relationship between the demand 
elasticity and critical merger size or critical combined pre-merger market. The next section 
gives us a more detailed analysis.  
 
4.2 Demand Elasticity, Profitable Merger size and Profitable Combined 
Pre-merger Market Share 
The aim of this subsection is to explore if a change in demand elasticity has an impact on 
the critical merger size and the critical market share required for a merger to be profit 
enhancing. With the assistance of Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, we could have a clearer picture of 
the demand elasticity’s impact. Before we go further, we would like to explain the variables in 
these two figures.    
1. Figure 4.2 is based on Table 4.19. The data in this table is calculated following the 
procedure of Example 4.1. Where:  
♦ n is the number of firms in the industry or the market size. 
♦ m values are all the critical merger sizes to let the insiders’ pre-merger profit 0Mπ  and 
post-merger profit *Mπ  be equal.  
♦ *m  is the feasible critical merger size for a profitable merger.  
 
2. Figure 4.3 is derived from Table 4.2. Where: 
♦ m and n are the same as in Figure 4.2.  
♦ m*/n is the critical insiders’ combined pre-merger market share for the merger to be profit 
enhancing. 
                                                 
9 Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 are derived from Table A1 in the appendix.  
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Table 4.1: The Critical Merger Sizes for Profitable Mergers Given  
Different Demand Elasticity Factors and Market Sizes 
m* 
n 
d=-0.005 d=0 d=0.005 d=5 d=1000 
3 2.36655 2.43845 2.53012 2.58363 2.58967 
5 3.89158 4 4.13216 4.20868 4.21737 
6 4.68648 4.80742 4.95299 5.03702 5.04664 
7 5.49654 5.62772 5.78412 5.87417 5.88446 
8 6.31887 6.45862 6.62399 6.71901 6.72985 
10 7.9925 8.1459 8.32541 8.42815 8.4399 
20 16.7003 16.8902 17.1067 17.2292 17.2431 
30 25.7026 25.9098 26.1434 26.2747 26.2896 
40 34.8596 35.0774 35.3212 35.4581 35.4735 
50 44.1159 44.3411 44.592 44.7324 44.7479 
60 53.4431 53.6738 53.9299 54.0729 54.0884 
70 62.8241 63.059 63.3193 63.4642 63.4797 
80 72.2477 72.4861 72.7497 72.8962 72.9133 
90 81.7062 81.9475 82.2138 82.3617 82.3782 
100 91.1939 91.4377 91.7063 91.8553 91.872 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The Critical Merger Sizes for Profitable Mergers Given 
Different Demand Elasticity Factors and Market Sizes 
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The trend in Figure 4.2 shows, with the increase in the number of the firms in the market, 
the critical number of insiders is steadily increasing in order to let the coalition be profitable. 
However, the effect of the demand elasticity factor is very marginal, which makes 5 lines 
squeeze into one, which is represented by the lower boundary of the shaded triangle. From the 
magnified figure at the right hand side of the corner, we find that an increase in the demand 
elasticity factor d increases the critical profitable merger size requirement, but at a dramatically 
decreasing speed. The lowest line represents the critical profitable merger sizes when d is 
-0.005, which is the lowest feasible value of the demand elasticity factor, thus all merger sizes 
above this line will be profit enhancing.  
 
In the standardized diagram, the upper boundary of this triangle is the 45-degree line. All 
the regions below this line are the feasible merger sizes. The lower boundary of the triangle is 
the critical profitable merger sizes when d is -0.005. Thus all the merger sizes lying between 
these two boundaries (The shaded triangle) are profitable merger sizes. 
 
There are many sources of economic power, such as vertical integration and the ability to 
operate on a global scale, and one main source is the merged members’ combined pre-merger 
market share (market share hereafter), which is what we wish to analyze in the rest of this 
section. The impact of the demand elasticity on the critical profitable market share is more 
pronounced in Figure 4.3, compared with its influence on the critical merger size for a 
profitable merger. When the demand curve is linear, it needs at least 80% of the market share to 
form a profitable merger, which is consistent with the prediction in the SSR model; when the 
demand function is concave, it needs more than 80% of the market share; and when the demand 
function is convex, it needs at least 77.8% of the market share for the merger to be profit 
enhancing.  
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Table 4.2: The Critical Combined Pre-merger Market Shares for Profitable 
Mergers Given Different Demand Elasticity Factors and Market Sizes 
m*/n 
n 
d=-0.005 d=0 d=2 d=5 d=1000 
3 78.89% 81.28% 84.34% 86.12% 86.32% 
5 77.83% 80% 82.64% 84.17% 84.35% 
6 78.11% 80.12% 82.55% 83.95% 84.11% 
7 78.52% 80.40% 82.63% 83.92% 84.06% 
8 78.99% 80.73% 82.80% 83.99% 84.12% 
10 79.93% 81.46% 83.25% 84.28% 84.40% 
20 83.50% 84.45% 85.53% 86.15% 86.22% 
30 85.68% 86.37% 87.14% 87.58% 87.63% 
40 87.15% 87.69% 88.30% 88.65% 88.68% 
50 88.23% 88.68% 89.18% 89.46% 89.50% 
60 89.07% 89.46% 89.88% 90.12% 90.15% 
70 89.75% 90.08% 90.46% 90.66% 90.69% 
80 90.31% 90.61% 90.94% 91.12% 91.14% 
90 90.785% 91.05% 91.35% 91.51% 91.53% 
100 91.19% 91.44% 91.71% 91.86% 91.87% 
 
Figure 4.3: The Critical Combined Pre-merger Market Shares for Profitable 
Mergers Given Different Demand Elasticity Factors and Market Sizes 
 
C
ri
tic
al
 M
ar
ke
t S
ha
re
 m
*/
n 
77.00% 
80.00% 
83.00% 
86.00% 
89.00% 
92.00% 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Numbers of Firms n 
d=1000 
d=5 
d=0.05 
d=0 
d=-0.005 
  
 
- 29 -
Alternatively, we could interpret the above results as: a merger facing an inelastic demand 
requires more market share to be profitable compared to one confronting an elastic demand 
market. It is also worthwhile to note that this difference tends to converge when there are more 
firms in the industry.  
 Even though the complexity of the equation prevents me from testing the effects of 
demand elasticity in a much larger size market with extremely large demand elasticity factor, it 
is still predictable that in the case of concave demand function, when the goods are perfectly 
inelastic in an extremely large market, only a monopoly will be profitable. As for the convex 
demand function market, the limitation of our specified model would not allow a very large 
elasticity of demand.  
 Now let us rule out the effect of market size, and concentrate on the demand elasticity’s 
effects on the critical merger size and profitability. In order to simplify our analysis, we assume 
there are 100 firms in the industry, and it will be easier for us to derive the critical profitable 
merger’s market share. We further assume the demand function is: 2
2
100 QdQP −−= , and 
each firm is operating at a constant marginal and average cost c=40.   
 
Table 4.3: The Critical Merger Sizes and the Combined Pre-merger Market 
Shares for Profitable Mergers Given Different Demand Elasticity 
d m value m* m*/n 
-0.005 imim
mm
5798.4051.110,5798.4051.110
,0.1,1939.91
43
21
+=−=
==
 91.1939 91.19% 
-0.004 imim
mm
8523.53166.115,8523.53166.115
,999999.0,2747.91
43
21
+=−=
==
 91.2747 91.27% 
-0.003 imim
mm
1373.73202.123,1373.73202.123
,999999.0,332.91
43
21
+=−=
==
 91.332 91.33% 
-0.002 imim
mm
697.10575.138,697.10575.138
,0.1,3753.91
43
21
+=−=
==
 91.3753 91.38% 
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-0.0001 imim
mm
34.898461.588,34.898461.588
,999963.0,4353.91
43
21
+=−=
==
 91.4353 91.44% 
0 562.111,999999.0,4377.91 321 === mmm  91.4377 91.44% 
0.0001 imim
mm
619.905619.592,619.90565.592
,00001.1,4402.91
43
21
+=−=
==
 91.4402 91.44% 
0.01 imim
mm
3012.46032.112,3012.46032.112
,999999.0,5774.91
43
21
+=−=
==
 91.5774 91.58% 
0.03 imim
mm
4033.26978.105,4033.26978.105
,999998.0,6677.91
43
21
+=−=
==
 91.6677 91.67% 
0.05 imim
mm
5561.21886.104,5561.21886.104
,0.1,7063.91
43
21
+=−=
==
 91.7063 91.71% 
0.07 imim
mm
2507.19428.104,2507.19428.104
,0.1,729.91
43
21
+=−=
==
 91.729 91.73% 
1 imim
mmm
8906.11234.103,8906.11234.103
,999996.0,983.100,8339.91
54
321
+=−=
===
 91.8339 91.83% 
2 992.100,2815.11153.103
,2815.11153.103,999999.0,8451.91
54
321
=+=
−===
mim
immm
 91.8451 91.85% 
5 997.100,7655.10087.103
,7655.10087.103,0.1,8553.91
54
321
=−=
+===
mim
immm
 91.8553 91.8553% 
20 imim
mmm
3395.10034.103,3395.10034.103
,0.1,999.100,8642.91
54
321
+=−=
===
 91.8642 91.8642% 
100 imim
mmm
111.10006.103,111.10006.103
,999998.0,103,8693.91
54
321
+=−=
===
 91.8693 91.8693% 
1000 
103,98668.9991.102,98668.9991.102
,1008397.5103,0.1,872.91
654
5
431
=+=−=
×+=== −
mimim
immm
 91.872 91.87% 
 
Where: 
♦ n is the market size. 
♦ m values are all the critical merger sizes to let the insiders’ pre-merger profit 0Mπ  and 
post-merger profit *Mπ  be equal.  
♦ m*/n is the critical insiders’ combined pre-merger market share for a profitable merger. 
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Table 4.3 gives us an unambiguously increasing trend of the critical merger sizes when the 
demand elasticity factor is increasingly large. Noted that when d is close to “0”, the change in 
merger size in response to demand elasticity is relatively obvious, thus, we would like to derive 
the relationship between the profit, demand elasticity and merger size by concentrating this 
range of d ( 7.0005.0 ≤≤− d ). Figure 4.4 illustrates the relationship among them.  
 
 
As shown In Figure 4.4, an increase in demand elasticity factor d increases the market 
share required for a merger to be profit enhancing, and the increase in d reduces the profit for a 
profitable merger. The effect of the demand elasticity on the unprofitable merger could be 
ignored. No matter what the range d lies in, if the merger size is not large enough, the coalition 
will never be profitable.    
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This thesis concentrates on how demand elasticity or the second order derivatives of 
demand has an effect on the merger’s profitability and the critical market share required for a 
profit enhancing merger in a Cournot oligopoly model with linear cost and quadratic demand. 
In the class of oligopolies in which P/Q remains unchanged in response to small changes in d, 
we have obtained a number of new results.   
 
The main contribution of our analysis is to provide the sufficient conditions for a merger to 
be profitable, and to show how demand elasticity affects the merger’s profitability. By studying 
the pattern of trends in a market consisting of 100 firms, we found that when the demand 
function is concave, it requires more than 80% combined pre-merger market share to be 
profitable compared with the SSR model, which predicts that 80% market share is enough for a 
merger to be profit enhancing. The greater the demand elasticity factor d, the larger the market 
share that is required for a profitable merger. On the contrary, when the demand function is 
convex, a merger with less than 80% of the market share would still be profitable.  
 
It is also worthwhile to note that demand elasticity is more influential on the merger’s 
profitability when the demand is relatively elastic, and an increase in the demand elasticity 
makes producers more profitable.  
  
 
- 33 -
In our discussion on the welfare effect, we find, in general, social welfare deteriorates after 
a merger as long as firms are operating at a constant marginal and average cost. However, a 
merger will be less harmful when the demand is very inelastic (d is a positive large number).  
 
Finally, we would like to refer to some possible extensions of the model as the concluding 
remarks:   
 
♦ One main limitation of our analysis is that we could not explore the effect of demand 
elasticity on the merger’s profitability and critical profitable merger sizes when the demand 
is relatively more elastic. This is due to the restriction we impose on the model 
a
d
2
1−> , 
which makes d range from a very small negative number to zero when the demand function 
is convex. As discussed in chapter 4, we would predict that when d is a very large negative 
number, or alternatively, the demand is perfectly elastic, much less market share is required 
for a profitable merger even with constant return to scale, which would be interesting. We 
could consider an alternative model, such as 2
1000
)( QdQaQP −−= . This model would 
allow us to go further in our analysis for the convex demand function case, because it 
relaxes the restriction to be 
a
d
250−> . 
♦ In our analysis, the merger’s output is always decreasing compared with their pre-merger 
level. However, the result could be ambiguous when the merger experiences economies of 
scale after they form a coalition, which is always true in real life. Firms will expand their 
output level when the cost is reduced. Thus, we could introduce a scale economy factor into 
our cost function. Our model could be further expanded when the cost function is 
asymmetric.  
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♦ Finally, applying this model in a heterogeneous goods market would serve as a more 
challenging analysis, but also one that is of considerable economic interest.   
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
For each individual firm i  to maximize its profit: 
iii cqqQ
dQa −−−= )
2
( 2π , where i
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k
n
k
k qqqQ +== ∑∑
≠=1
 
or iii
ik
ki
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ki cqqqq
dqqa −⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
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2(
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)( ）π  
The first order condition is:  
0)()(
2
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q iiik
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k
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i
iπ ,     (A3.1) 
or 0
2
2 =−−−−− cdQqQdQqa ii            (A3.1a) 
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, the output of each firm in the industry will be identical, so 
that, for all )( Mii ∈  and )( Mjj ∉ , 0qqq ji == ,  
or 0
2
2020200 =−−−−− cdnqqndnqqa            (A3.1b)  
Solving for 0q  in equation A3.1b, we get proposition 1.  
 
Check the second order condition: 0)(22
2
2
<−+−−=∂
∂ ∑
≠
ii
ik
k
i
i dqqqd
q
π    
0)12(
20
qn
d +
−>>⇒ , or 0>d . 
Thus, in pre-merger equilibrium, 
For each outsider and insider, the individual profit is: 
000 )( ii qcP −=π  
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For the merged firm M, the combined pre-merger profit is: 
000 )( iM qcPm −=π  
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The total producer surplus will be: 
000 )( QcP −=π  
[ ] [ ]
32
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The total consumer surplus will be: 
∫ ×−−−= 00 0020 )2(
Q QPdQQdQaCS   
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Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
(1) The difference between the Cournot pre-merger equilibrium individual firm’s output in the 
quadratic demand model and the linear demand model is:  
)1)(2(
)2()1()2(2)1()1( 2200
++
+−++++++−=−
nndn
nndnnndnn
qq iLi
ωω
     (A3.2.1) 
Let the numerator 122 )2()1()2(2)1()1( ρωω =+−++++++− nndnnndnn   
Then 0lim 10 =→ ρd  
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10
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<∂
∂
→ ρ
ρ
d
d
 
⇒ 01 <ρ , when 0>d .        
Since the denominator in equation A3.2.1 is positive when d>0 
⇒  00 iLi qq < , when 0>d .  
We could prove when 0,0 1 >< ρd , then 00 iLi qq >  by using the same method.  
Thus, compared with the production in the linear demand model, individual firm produces more 
output when the demand function is convex, and fewer outputs when the demand function is 
concave.   
Q.E.D. 
 
 
(2) The difference between the Cournot pre-merger equilibrium market price in the quadratic 
demand model and the linear demand model is:  
)1()2(
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2
22
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     (A3.2.2) 
Since 122 )2()1()2(2)1()1( ρωω −=++++++−+ nndnnndnn , we could get the opposite result 
to (1). Compared with the market price in the linear demand model, market price is lower when 
the demand function is convex and higher when the demand function is concave.   
Q.E.D. 
 
 
(3) The difference between the Cournot pre-merger equilibrium individual firm’s profit in the 
quadratic demand model and the linear demand model is:   
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Let the numerator: ( )
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Solve for 02 >ρ   
We get 0
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Since the denominator in equation A3.2.3 is always positive, thus, 
 
When ,0>d  we could get 02 <ρ 00 iLi ππ <⇒  
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A merger generally earns more profit when the demand function is linear, except when the 
demand elasticity factor ranges from 
3
2
)2(
)1(
4 +
+−
n
n
ω  to 0 .  
Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 3:  
After a merger, for each firm i  to maximize its profit:  
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Specifically, for the merged firm M to maximize its profit:  
MMM
Mk
kM
Mk
kM cqqqq
dqqa −⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +−+−= ∑∑
≠≠
2(
2
)( ）π   
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There are )1( +−mn  firms in the market after merger, then:  
for all )( Mjj ∉  and )( MiM ∈ , *qqq Mj ==  
*)1( qmnQ +−=  
or 0
2
*2* =−−−−− cdQqQdQqa      
or 0)1()1(
2
)1( *
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Solve for *q  in equation A3.3b leads to Proposition 3.     
 
Check the second order condition:    
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To simplify the notations, let 1* +−= mnn  
Thus, for each outsider and the coalition, the profit will be:  
**** )( qcPMj −== ππ  
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The producer surplus after merger will be: 
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The consumer surplus will be:  
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Proof of Proposition 4 (When d>0) 
To simplify the notations, 
Let ca −=ω  
1+= nX  
2+−= mnY  
 
(1) The difference between a coalition’s post-merger output and combined pre-merger output is:  
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Since the denominator for equation 3.4.1 is positive,  
⇒  0* mqq <  
The coalition’s total output contracts in relative to its pre-merger level.  
Q.E.D. 
  
 
- 42 -
(2) The individual outsider’s output change is given by 
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Since the denominator for equation A3.4.2 is positive,  
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Each outsider will expand individual output following the merger. 
Q.E.D. 
 
 
(3) The total output change in the market is: 
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The unique Cournot-Nash Equilibrium (CNE) is characterized by the F.O.C conditions for 
profit maximization of n firms:  
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The Merger leads to the contraction of the total output in the market relative to the pre-merger 
level.  
Q.E.D. 
 
(4) Price will rise after merging.  
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Proof of Proposition 4 (When d<0) 
(1) The difference between a coalition’s post-merger output and combined pre-merger output is:   
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Since the denominator for equation A3.4.1 is negative,  
⇒  0* mqq < , which is the same result as when d>0. 
Q.E.D.   
 
 
(2) The individual outsider’s output change is given by:  
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(4) Price will rise after merging. 
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Table A1: The Critical Merger Sizes and Market Shares for Profitable Mergers 
Given Different Demand Elasticity Factors and Market Sizes10 
 
Where: 
♦ n is the market size 
♦ m values are all the critical merger sizes to allow the insiders’ combined pre-merger 
profit 0Mπ  and post-merger profit *Mπ  to be equal.  
♦ *m  is the feasible critical merger size for a profitable merger. 
♦ m*/n is the least insiders’ combined pre-merger market share for a profitable merger.      
 
d n m values m* m*/n 
-0.005 3 imim
mm
20187.591203.7,20187.591203.7
,0.1,36655.2
43
21
+=−=
==
 2.36655 78.89% 
 5 imim
mm
89765.6416.10,89765.6415.10
,0.1,89158.3
43
21
+=−=
==
 3.89158 77.83% 
 6 imim
mm
66484.76322.116,66484.76322.11
,0.1,68648.4
43
21
+=−=
==
 4.68648 78.11% 
 7 imim
mm
3909.883.12,3909.883.12
,0.1,49654.5
43
21
+=−=
==
 5.49654 78.52% 
 8 imim
mm
08225.90124.14,08225.90124.14
,0.1,31887.6
43
21
+=−=
==
 6.31887 78.99% 
 10 imim
mm
3793.103392.16,3793.03392.16
,0.1,9925.7
43
21
+=−=
==
 7.9925 79.93% 
 20 imim
mm
7726.155097.27,7726.155097.27
,0.1,7003.16
43
21
+=−=
==
 16.7003 83.50% 
 30 imim
mm
1252.202725.38,1252.202725.38
,0.1,7026.25
43
21
+=−=
==
 25.7026 85.68% 
 40 imim
mm
8812.238282.48,8812.238282.48
,0.1,8596.34
43
21
+=−=
==
 34.8596 87.15% 
 50 imim
mm
2336.272577.59,2336.272577.59
,0.1,1159.44
43
21
+=−=
==
 44.1159 88.23% 
                                                 
10 When ,0≠d  { } { }
)1()1(
)()12)(1(2
)1()1(
)()12)(1(
2 222222
0*
−+
+−+++−+−−+
+−+++−+=−
XXd
XXXXdm
YYd
YYYYd
MM
ααωββωππ  
When d=0, 
2
2
2
2
0*
)1(
)(
)2(
)(
+
−−+−
−=−
n
cam
mn
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MM ππ  
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 60 imim
mm
2885.306026.69,2885.306026.69
,0.1,4431.53
43
21
+=−=
==
 53.4431 89.07% 
 70 imim
mm
1119.338873.79,1119.338873.79
,0.1,8241.62
43
21
+=−=
==
 62.8241 89.75% 
 80 imim
mm
7483.351271.90,7483.351271.90
,0.1,2477.72
53
21
+=−=
==
 72.2477 90.31% 
 90 imim
mm
2297.38332.100,2297.38332.100
,0.1,7062.81
43
21
+=−=
==
 81.7062 90.785% 
 100 imim
mm
5798.4051.110,5798.4051.110
,0.1,1939.91
43
21
+=−=
==
 91.1939 91.19% 
     
d n m values m* m*/n 
0 3 56155.6,0.1,43845.2 321 === mmm  2.43845 81.28% 
 5 9,0.1,0.4 321 === mmm  4 80% 
 6 1926.10,0.1,80742.4 321 === mmm  4.80742 80.12% 
 7 3723.11,0.1,62772.5 321 === mmm  5.62772 80.40% 
 8 5414.12,0.1,45862.6 321 === mmm  6.45862 80.73% 
 10 8541.14,999999.0,1459.8 321 === mmm  8.1459 81.46% 
 20 8902.16,999999.0,8902.16 321 === mmm  16.8902 84.45% 
 30 0902.37,999999.0,9098.25 321 === mmm  25.9098 86.37% 
 40 9226.47,0.1,0774.35 321 === mmm  35.0774 87.69% 
 50 6589.58,0.1,3411.44 321 === mmm  44.3411 88.68% 
 60 3262.69,0.1,6738.53 321 === mmm  53.6738 89.46% 
 70 941.79,0.1,059.63 321 === mmm  63.059 90.08% 
 80 5139.90,0.1,4861.72 321 === mmm  72.4861 90.61% 
 90 052.101,0.1,9475.81 321 === mmm  81.9475 91.05% 
 100 562.111,999999.0,4377.91 321 === mmm  91.4377 91.44% 
     
d n m values m* m*/n 
0.05 3 imim
mm
27804.354682.6,27804.354682.6
,999998.0,53012.2
43
21
+=−=
==
 2.53012 84.34% 
 5 imim
mm
2549.473164.8,2549.473164.8
,999999.0,13216.4
43
21
+=−=
==
 4.13216 82.64% 
 6 imim
mm
68696.480577.9,68696.480577.9
,0.1,95299.4
43
21
+=−=
==
 4.95299 82.55% 
 7 imim
mm
09188.58712.10,09188.58712.10
,0.1,78412.5
43
21
+=−=
==
 5.78412 82.63% 
 8 imim
mm
47436.59295.11,47436.59295.11
,0.1,62399.6
43
21
+=−=
==
 6.62399 82.80% 
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 10 imim
mm
18497.60295.14,18497.60295.14
,0.1,32541.8
43
21
+=−=
==
 8.32541 83.25% 
 20 imim
mm
06484.93438.24,06484.93438.24
,0.1,1067.17
43
21
+=−=
==
 17.1067 85.53% 
 30 imim
mm
3237.115146.34,3237.115146.34
,999998.0,1434.26
43
21
+=−=
==
 26.1434 87.14% 
 40 imim
mm
239.136237.44,2399.136237.44
,0.1,3212.35
43
21
+=−=
==
 35.3212 88.30% 
 50 imim
mm
9309.147.54,9309.147.54
,999999.0,592.44
43
21
+=−=
==  44.592 89.18% 
 60 imim
mm
4597.167564.64,4597.167564.64
,0.1,9299.53
43
21
+=−=
==  53.9299 89.88% 
 70 imim
mm
8648.178.74,8648.178.74
,999999.0,3193.63
43
21
+=−=
==  63.3193 90.46% 
 80 imim
mm
1714.198346.84,1714.198346.84
,0.1,7497.72
43
21
+=−=
==
 72.7497 90.94% 
 90 3975.208629.94,3975.208629.94
,0.1,2138.82
43
21
+=−=
==
mim
mm  82.2138 91.35% 
 100 imim
mm
5561.21886.104,5561.21886.104
,0.1,7063.91
43
21
+=−=
==
 91.7063 91.71% 
     
d n m values m* m*/n 
5 3 imim
mm
74027.188364.5,74027.188364.5
,999997.0,58363.2
43
21
−=+=
==
 2.58363 86.12% 
 5 imim
mm
26682.291895.7,26682.291895.7
,999996.0,20868.4
43
21
−=+=
==
 4.20868 84.17% 
 6 imim
mm
49445.2933.8,49445.2933.8
,0.1,03702.5
43
21
−=+=
==
 5.03702 83.95% 
 7 imim
mm
70547.294516.9,70547.294516.9
,999999.0,87417.5
43
21
−=+=
==
 5.87417 83.92% 
 8 imim
mm
90304.29558.10,90304.29558.10
,0.1,71901.6
43
21
−=+=
==
 6.71901 83.99% 
 10 imim
mm
26621.39734.12,26621.39734.12
,0.1,42815.8
43
21
−=+=
==
 8.42815 84.28% 
 20 imim
mm
70344.40228.23,70244.40228.23
,999999.0,2292.17
43
21
−=+=
==
 17.2292 86.15% 
 30 imim
mm
80922.50458.33,80922.50458.33
,0.1,2747.26
43
21
−=+=
==
 26.2747 87.58% 
 40 9967.40,7407.60591.43
,7407.60591.43,999999.0,4581.35
54
321
=−=
+===
mim
immm
 35.4581 88.65% 
  
 
- 50 -
 50 imim
immm
56002.70677.53,56002.70677.53
,56002.70677.53,999996.0,7324.44
54
321
−=−=
+===
 44.7324 89.46% 
 60 9967.60,29985.80739.63
,29985.80739.63,999997.0,0729.54
54
321
=−=
+===
mim
immm
 54.0729 90.12% 
 70 9967.70,97951.80784.73
,97951.80784.73,0.1,4642.63
54
321
=−=
+===
mim
immm
 63.4642 90.66% 
 80 9967.80,61155.90819.83
,61155.90819.83,999999.0,8962.72
54
321
=−=
+===
mim
immm
 72.8962 91.12% 
 90 9967.90,2048.100847.93
,2048.100847.93,0.1,3617.82
54
321
=−=
+===
mim
immm
 82.3617 91.51% 
 100 997.100,7655.10087.103
,7655.10087.103,0.1,8553.91
54
321
=−=
+===
mim
immm
 91.8553 91.86% 
     
d n m values m* m*/n 
1000 3 99999.5,00002.4,61485.183508.5
,61495.183508.5,00001.1,58967.2
654
321
==−=
+===
mmim
immm
 2.58967 86.32% 
 5 99999.7,0001.6,10706.286148.7
,10706.286148.7,0.1,21737.4
654
321
==−=
+===
mmim
immm
 4.21737 84.35% 
 6 99987.6,31933.287218.8
,31933.287218.8,999998.0,04664.5
54
321
=−=
+===
mim
immm
 5.04664 84.11% 
 7 13,51586.288154.9
,51586.288154.9,999999.0,88446.5
54
321
=−=
+===
mim
immm
 5.88446 84.06% 
 8 ,69969.28897.10,69969.28897.10
,0.1,72985.6
43
21
imim
mm
−=+=
==
 6.72985 84.12% 
 10 13,0373.39033.12
,0373.39033.12,999998.0,4399.8
54
321
=−=
+===
mim
immm
 8.4399 84.40% 
 20 23,0004.21,3708.49416.22
,3708.49416.22,999998.0,2431.17
654
321
==−=
+===
mmim
immm
 17.2431 86.22% 
 30 33,0004.31,39554.59592.32
,39554.59592.32,0.1,2896.26
654
321
==−=
+===
mmim
immm
 26.2896 87.63% 
 40 9983.40,25843.69693.42
,25843.69693.42,0.1,4735.35
54
321
=−=
+===
mim
immm
 35.4735 88.68% 
 50 53,0021.51,01711.7976.52
,01711.7976.52,999997.0,7479.44
654
321
==−=
+===
mmim
immm
 44.7479 89.50% 
 60 63,0068.61,70215.79808.62
,70215.79808.62,999998.0,0884.54
654
321
==−=
+===
mmim
immm
 54.0884 90.15% 
 70 73,0123.71,33145.89843.72
,33145.89843.72,0.1,4797.63
654
321
==−=
+===
mmim
immm
 63.4797 90.69% 
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 80 
im
imim
immm
6
6
6
54
321
1054662.283
,1054662.283,91828.89866.82
,91828.89866.82,0.1,9133.72
−
−
×−=
×+=−=
+===
 72.9133 91.14% 
 90 
93
,1002059.39999.92,4672.99888.92
,4672.99888.92,0.1,3782.82
6
5
54
321
=
×−=−=
+===
−
m
imim
immm
 82.3782 91.53% 
 100 
103
,1008397.5103,98668.9991.102
,98668.9991.102,0.1,872.91
6
5
54
321
=
×+=−=
+===
−
m
imim
immm
 91.872 91.87% 
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